The Supreme Court through its recent judgement in the case of Commanding Officer, Railway Protection Special Force, Mumbai V. Bhavnaben Dinshbhai Bhabhor & Ors. held that despite declaring the Railway Protection Force (“RPF'') as a member of the Armed Force of the Union, the members of the RPF will be entitled to claim compensation under the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 (“1923 Act”). It held that the intent of the legislatures was not to take RPF outside the purview of the 1923 Act. The authors of this article extol the judgement however criticize the approach adopted by the Court.
FACTUAL MATRIX
The respondent's husband was a constable in the Railway Protection Special Force, a branch of the RPF, who died in the course of his employment. Consequently, the respondent and the heirs of the deceased claimed compensation under the 1923 Act asserting that at the time of the accident, the deceased was twenty-five years old and receiving a monthly wage of rupees eight thousand. The appellant opposed this claim on the ground that the deceased was a member of the Armed Force of the Union and therefore he was not a workman under the provisions of the 1923 Act thereby disentitling him from his claim.
The Commissioner held the claim petition to be maintainable since the deceased was a Railway servant as per Clause 34 of Section 2 of the Railway Act 1989 (“1989 Act'') and therefore he would be a workman as per Section 2(1)(n)(i) of the 1923 Act. The Commissioner mandated the appellant to pay Rupee 4,33,820/- within thirty days from the date of order with 9 per cent interest. The appellant appealed to the Gujarat High Court from the said order of the Commissioner. The appellant contended that Section 2(1)(n) of the 1923 Act precludes from its ambit any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union. He further contended that Section 3 of the Railway Protection Force Act 1957 ("1957 Act") declares a member of the Railway Protection Force as an Armed Force of the Union, and the deceased was not a workman under Section 2(n) of the Act, hence the claim was not maintainable. However, their appeal was dismissed, therefore, the appellant moved the Apex Court.
OBSERVATIONS OF THE APEX COURT
The Court held the claim raised by the respondent to be maintainable under the 1923 Act. It held that “Armed Forces of the Union” has not been defined in the Indian Constitution or the General Clauses Act or the 1923 Act. Therefore, it cannot be excluded from the ambit of the 1923 Act even if Section 3 of the 1957 Act declares that the Armed Forces of the Union includes a member of the RPF.
The definition of a ‘railway servant’ as laid down under Clause 34 of Section 2 of the 1989 Act was amended. By the said amendment, railway servant recognised a member of the RPF within its ambit. The railway servant continued to be a workman as per Section 2(1)(dd) of the 1923 Act, and the provision of the 1923 Act would extend to a member of an RPF as he did not fall under any categories stipulated in Schedule II of the 1923 Act.
ANALYSIS
The conundrum of treating a member of the RPF as a workman /employee within the meaning of the 1923 Act has been a subject of perpetual debate. Since the Act in itself does not specifically mention members of RPF as an employee entitled to claim compensation, it takes a cue from the definition provided in the 1989 Act. Section 2(34) of the 1989 Act states that “railway servant means any person employed by the Central Government or by a railway administration in connection with the service of a railway including member of the Railway Protection Force appointed under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957.” Further, the definition of an employee under the 1923 Act in this regards states that “employee means a person, who is a railway servant as defined in clause (34) of section 2 of the Railways Act, 1989 not permanently employed in any administrative district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II.” A combined reading of these provisions very clearly concludes that a member of the RPF would be construed as an employee under the 1923 Act and would therefore be entitled to claim compensation.
However, there has been a fragmented jurisprudence when it came to interpreting these provisions and compensating the members of the RPF under the 1923 Act. The Calcutta High Court in the case of General Manager, South Eastern Railway V. Soyaba Khatoon held “RPF personnel although deemed to be Railway servants for the purpose of Indian Railways Act, cannot be deemed to be a workman within the meaning of the 1923 Act. Therefore, the application for compensation filed by the opposite party before the Commissioner was not maintainable and the Commissioner exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by law by entertaining such dispute.”
Similarly, in the case of Chief Security Commissioner (RPF), Calcutta and Ors. V. Shrista Devi it was held that after amendment in Section 3(1) of the 1957 Act, the deceased constable, who was a member of "Force" became a member of "Armed Force of the Union". Section 2(n)(ii) (now Section 2(1)(dd)(iii)) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (now Employee’s Compensation Act), debars a person to be treated as a workman, who is employed in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union. Therefore, compensation under the 1923 Act cannot be granted to his wife.
However, in the case of Union of India V. Ninamas Adiyabhai Titabhai1 the respondent, a member of an RPF became amputated below his knees during the course of employment. The Court granted him compensation while recognising him as a workman under the provisions of the 1923 Act. Further, in the case of Vijaykumar Malviya V. Union of India2, the application under the 1923 Act of an RPF employee who got injured during the course of this employment was allowed by the Bombay High Court.
By way of these cases, we can see the gradual shift of judicial interpretation towards endorsement of the beneficial nature of labour laws keeping the intent of the legislature alive. However, this should also be reflected in the statutes itself by way of an amendment to avoid further conflicts.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESENT CASE
Even though the judgement promotes the beneficial nature of the 1923 Act and provides relief to the aggrieved party, the approach adopted by the Court is flawed. The Court surpassed the statutory provisions in granting compensation to the deceased by recognising him as a ‘workman’ under Section 2(1)(n) of the Act by prioritising the legislative intent over the statute itself. The Court in the present case took note of Section 3 of the 1957 Act which is clear on its stance that the members of the RPF shall be construed as a part of the Armed Force of the Union, however, it went out to rule that such declaration does not exclude the applicability of the 1923 Act, completely ignoring Section 2(1)(dd)(iii) of the1923 Act.
Armed forces of the Union have not been defined in any statutes including the Constitution of India and the General Clauses Act. The phrase ‘Armed Forces of the Union’ came into effect from 26th January 1950 as a replacement for the words ‘His Majesty’s naval, military, air forces’ vide Adaptation of Law Orders 1950. Armed Force of the Union which includes Army, Navy and the Air Force of the present day might claim benefits under the 1923 act which would lead to increased litigation burdening the already overburdened judiciary.
The authors are of the view that firstly, an amendment in the 1957 Act is imperative at this juncture to clarify the position of law regarding RPF being a member of the Armed Forces of the Union or not. Secondly, the Court overstepped the statutory confines by granting compensation to the heirs of the deceased on the basis of the legislative intent of the Act. Thirdly, a combined reading of Section 2(34) of the 1989 Act and Section 2(1)(dd)(i) of the 1923 Act clearly show that RPF would be entitled to benefits under the latter Act. However, the Railways Protection Force Act, 1957 defines RPF as a member of the Armed Force of the Union by virtue of Section 3 of the Act and the 1923 Act vide Section 2(1)(dd)(iii) specifically excludes armed forces of the Union from claiming benefits under it. Therefore, the Court should not have endorsed the inclusion of the Armed Forces of the Union as a beneficiary under the 1923 Act. Instead, they should have made RPF an exception to the current position of law.
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